Emission projections 2008-2012 versus National Allocation Plans II by Neuhoff, K et al.
26.9.2006 
  1 
 
Emission projections 2008-2012 versus NAPs II1 
 
26.9.2006 
 
Karsten Neuhoff, Federico Ferrario, Michael Grubb 
University of Cambridge 
 
Etienne Gabel, Kim Keats  
ICF International 
 
 
 
 
Convened by Climate Strategies [INSERT LOGO] 
Available from www.climate-strategies.org 
                                                 
1 We are grateful for extensive help and discussions from Terry Barker, Stephan Schleicher (Austria), Felix 
Matthes (Germany), Luis Olmos (Spain), Jos Sijm (Netherlands), Michal Sobotka (Poland) and Misato  
Sato. Financial support from the UK research council grant TSEC 2 is gratefully acknowledged. 
26.9.2006 
  2 
 
 
I. Introduction  
 
The aim of this paper is to assess the implications of the National Allocation Plans 
proposed for the second phase of the EU ETS, 2008-12. As of mid September, almost all 
Member States had plans either submitted for approval to the European Commission, or 
published for consultation. Our aim is to assess the collective implications of these plans 
for the operation of the EU ETS in Phase II, if they were to be approved.  
 
Apart from collating the information in the NAPs – itself a complex exercise given some 
of the special provisions – this requires projection of emissions under different scenarios. 
We first set the context by comparing allocations against extrapolation of past trends, and 
explore the implications of different price and growth scenarios using detailed model 
analyses.  
 
II. Methodology and assumptions 
We compare the publicly available national allocation plans (NAPs) for the period 2008-2012 with 
a best estimate for CO2 emissions by the installations covered by these NAPs. Our key findings are: 
 
1. The collective allocations proposed under Phase II NAPs exceed the historic trend of emissions 
extrapolated forward, but are below model-based ‘business-as-usual’ forecasts. 
 
2. The gap (potential demand) is very small in the case of ‘favourable to gas’ fuel prices, a few 
percent in the case of ‘favourable to coal’ fuel prices. 
 
3.  Even in the high case, the potential demand is smaller than most estimates of the volume of 
CDM/JI credits available to ETS. 
 
4. Based on an ensemble of emission projections under uncertainty in fuel prices, economic growth 
rates, performance of the non-power sector and CDM/JI availability we find: 
a. Taking no account of CDM/JI, there is c.15% chance of a ‘dead market’ (emissions below cap 
even at zero price), and a roughly 50:50 chance of the market sustaining 20€/tCO2. 
b. However, with an expected inflow of committed CDM/JI credits (100 MtCO2/year) into ETS the 
allowance supply will exceed demand in 50% of cases without any carbon price, and in 80% of our 
20€/tCO2 scenarios 
c. At the high end of CDM/JI inflows into ETS (200 Mt/yr), there would be excess supply in more 
than 80% of scenarios in both cases.  
 
5. Consequently, we conclude that if currently proposed Phase II NAPs were approved, prices 
would tend to be very low and only small volumes of CDM/JI would enter the EU ETS 
 
6. Current proposed NAP allocation would therefore result in CDM/JI being almost exclusively 
public sector funded, placing the cost of Kyoto compliance entirely upon government Treasuries, 
and exacerbating the cost by removing any significant incentive to abate in the EU ETS sectors  
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To project future CO2 emissions, we treat the power sector separately from other sectors 
covered by the ETS. For the power sector we examine emissions using the Integrated 
Planning Model (IPM®) of ICF International which simulates every European power 
station and investment decisions in new power stations. For the remaining sectors we use 
two approaches. First, we start from the verified emissions from 2005, adjust for the 
coverage of the ETS and then apply sector specific growth rates from a recent DTI BAU 
study combined with country specific CO2 growth rates from OECD projections. The 
second approach to project emissions of the non-power sectors involves applying country 
and sector specific CO2 growth rate as determined by the E3ME model of Cambridge 
Econometrics and calibrated for the Matisse FP6 project assuming CO2 prices around 20 
€/tCO2. The detailed assumptions and our treatment of missing data are explained in 
Appendix I and II. 
 
To explore sensitivity to prices, we use four different fuel price assumptions from a 
recent UK Department of Trade and Industry study (DTI 2006c) (Appendix III). 
 
To determine the total cap, we use the publicly available data from NAPs, assuming in 
the following figures that all new entrant reserves will be issued. Some NAPs 2 envisage 
that New Entrant Reserves will be cancelled if not issued to new entrants. Without any 
new build in these countries, the total EU cap would be reduced by 40 Mt CO2/year. 
  
We furthermore assume an inflow of allowances into ETS from CDM and JI projects. 
Following a more detailed discussion in Grubb and Neuhoff (2006), we assume between 
0 and 1000 MtCO2 international project credits and allowances could be available to 
enter the ETS during the period 2008-2012.  The upper level is one third lower than the 
total projected availability of CDM and JI for Europe, assuming that at least some of the 
inflow would be taken by government inflow in all cases; it is also roughly consistent 
with the ‘supplementarity’ constraint that many MS have built into their plans, 
representing even at this maximum level an inflow of less than 10% of allocated 
allowances. Table 1 gives the range that we assume for cap and inflow (Appendix IV). 
 
CAP 2089 
CAP with NER 2202 
CAP with NER, low CDM/JI inflow 2402 
Table 1 depicts our estimations on CAP including inflows from JI and CDM projects (MtCO2/year). 
 
 
III. Emission projections in relation to historic trend  
 
To verify our emission projections we first compared them to historic emissions from 
1990-2004 using data from the Euroepean Community GHG Inventory (EEA 2006) 
                                                 
2 The NAPs specify that Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Portugal should not 
to sell the excess NER back to the market. In the French NAP it is not decided whether to cancel the excess 
NER or auction it, but for the purpose of calculating the maximum possible reduction of the Cap we 
assume that it will be cancelled. 
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(Figures 1 and 2). As the Inventory only provides data on the total national GHG 
emissions, for the purposes of these figures we assume that the share of emissions 
associated with ETS stays constant (Georgopoulou et al. 2005). Applying a linear trend to 
this historic emission from 1990-2004 (later start for accession countries), we 
extrapolated the BAU development of emissions for 2005-2012 (Appendix V).  
 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 illustrate that the emissions under this linear trend are lower than 
projected in either of our two base case scenarios. The fundamental reasons why 
emissions resume growth in the modeling projections, after a decade of decline or 
stability, is probably due to an assumed slowdown in the rate of energy efficiency 
improvements and a slowdown in the historic shift from coal towards natural gas, in the 
light of higher natural gas prices.  We do however note a general tendency that models 
have previously projected growth that has not materialized, and to this extent our results 
may be conservative.– the excess allocation that we find under the currently envisaged 
NAPIIs might be even higher in practice.  
 
To set this in the context of Phase II allocations, the total Phase II CAP with NER 
implied in the present NAPs is slightly above the average emissions levels over the past 
10 years.  
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Figure 1 Linear trend of ETS emissions compared to base case simulation results for the case of 0 
CO2 price. 
 
 
Figure 2 illustrates that, with a price of €20/tCO2, emissions from the ETS sectors are 
projected to be roughly stable at current levels, still slightly above the historic trend.  
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Figure 2 Linear trend of ETS emissions compared to base case simulation results for the case of 20 
€/tCO2 price. 
 
 
IV. Numerical results from simulations under uncertainty 
 
Figure 3 compares the total NAP II allocation (the horizontal line spanning 2008-12) 
against most recent emissions, the Phase I cap, and our range of projections for emissions 
over the period if there were no EU ETS.  With the blue vertical bars we also show the  
the range of potential inflow from JI and CDM credits into ETS. 
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Figure 3 Projected CO2 emissions versus Cap for the BAU (assuming zero CO2 price) 
 
Note that the Phase I cap was significantly above the 2005 verified emissions, and the 
NAP II allocations in turn represent a significant increase over Phase I.  
 
Our model estimates of emissions for 2006 exceed the 2005 verified emissions, for four 
reasons. First, in the electricity modeling we do not reflect that some gas generation is 
operated despite being more expensive than coal, because it is supplied under take-or-pay 
gas contracts. This would have increased CO2 emissions by 100 Mt. Second, the 
electricity model calculates aggregate CO2 emissions that exceed verified emissions by 
25 Mt. Third, with GDP growth emissions of the non-power sector are expected to grow 
by 25 Mt. Fourth, 55.1 Mt of additional installations are covered under NAP II, that 
either opted out of NAP I, or where the coverage is extended. 
 
The results for 2008-12 illustrate that emission projections are subject to considerable 
uncertainty. Across our range of assumptions, the Figure illustrates the distribution in 
term of five probability bands, with the central red illustrating the central 20% of scenario 
outcomes.  The results show that even with a ‘zero carbon price’ (a ‘no EU ETS’ 
scenario):  
 
- without any inflow of CDM and JI credits, allowance supply will exceed demand in 
20% of our scenarios. In other words, based on the current NAPs and range of other input 
assumptions, there is a one-in-five risk that the EU ETS would be unable to sustain any 
carbon market or incentive to abate, at home or abroad.  We could only expect a positive 
price if banking moves a significant share of the allowances towards post-2012. 
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- if inflows from JI and CDM projects are high (200 MtCO2/year), 80% of the projections  
result in excess supply. Obviously, there is a certain paradox in a combination of high 
emission credit imports with an overall surplus market, but it illustrates that current Phase 
II allocations are extremely unlikely to support private purchase of emission credits on 
the scale that suppliers may be hoping for even at very low carbon prices. 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the equivalent results if the power sector adjusts investment and 
operational decisions to reflect a Carbon price of 20 €/tCO2 (we do not explicitly model 
the response of non-power sector, hence again our results are likely to be conservative).  
Obviously, this reduces the total emissions in our 24 model scenarios, as depicted.  
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Figure 4 Projected emissions and Cap, when the power sector is exposed to 20 €/tCO2 price. 
 
The Figure illustrates that: 
- in 50% of the scenarios assuming an allowance price of 20 €/tCO2, emissions would 
fall below the European cap even without any inflows of JI and CDM credits into the 
EU ETS.  
- At the high level of credit inflow, the probability of sustaining a 20€/t price is very 
small, and even on our central case (100MtC/yr), there is only a 20% chance of the 
market sustaining a price of €20/t.   
 
This suggests that the currently published allocation levels of NAPs II are simply not 
consistent with sustaining CO2 prices at any like the levels seen to date.   
 
The level of the CO2 emissions in this projection suggests that if the European countries 
want to ensure CO2 prices close to 20 €/tCO2 then they have to significantly reduce the 
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aggregated EU Cap.  The implication based on our projections is that if a 200Mt 
tightening were associated with a similar level of JI/CDM imports (200Mt/yr), there 
would then be a roughly 50% chance of the market sustaining a price of around €20/t – 
before taking account of responses outside the power sector.  
 
 
V. Discussion 
 
V,a. Implications for the NAP approval process 
 
Our analysis implies that the currently proposed allocations are unlikely to support a 
viable CO2 market. If other analyses confirm this, this conclusion obviously puts a 
spotlight on the approval process. The Commission has to evaluate each NAP on its own 
merits, in relation to the criteria laid out in the Directive. Nevertheless, given the relative 
ambition of some of the NAPs (eg. Spain, Italy, UK) our collective result must imply that 
many other NAPs contain overallocation based on emission projections which, at least 
when considered collectively, are implausible. This would contravene relevant terms of 
the Directive. 
 
A further basis on which the Commission might critically assess the national allocation 
plans are state aid considerations. Johnsten (2006) argues that free allowance allocation 
does constitute state aid, which has to be notified according to the Directive. One relevant 
provision for the assessment of such state aid could be the proportionality principle – the 
benefits from the free allocation should be proportional to the transition cost for 
companies from the introduction of emission trading.   
 
Moreover, the weak allocations raise questions about the consistency of plans with 
national Kyoto targets, which is another criteria relevant to Commission assessment.  In 
principle, countries could ‘fill the gap’ with purchases of JI/CDM, to which we now turn. 
 
 
V.b. Implications for CDM / JI credits and government purchase 
 
Weak allocations in the EU ETS do not necessarily imply a weak market for CDM/JI 
credits. As long as countries comply with Kyoto, the total demand for CDM/JI (or 
equivalent transfers of AAUs under Green Investment Schemes – an option not open to 
ETS private sector participants) is set by the difference between national emissions and 
Kyoto targets over 2008-12. The real implication of weak EU ETS allocations is what it 
does to the cost of compliance to governments, specifically Finance ministries and 
taxpayers, through three factors:  
 Substitution:  more allocations to ETS sectors mean the private sector will have 
less need to purchase CDM/JI credits that would contribute to national 
compliance; governments must pay for these directly.  
 Increased total need: a weak EU ETS price means that EU ETS sectors undertake 
less abatement, resulting in higher national emissions, and in aggregate a greater 
total need for CDM/JI credits. National governments could also decide to acquire 
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additional AAUs from countries like Russia and the Ukraine. It is currently 
unclear to what extent that is politically acceptable and what level of ‘greening’ 
would be desired. 
 Price escalation: the greater aggregate demand for CDM/JI credits might 
reasonably be assumed to have some impact on the overall CDM/JI market, 
increasing the price.  
 
In short, the weak EU ETS allocations mean that governments have to take up the slack, 
and substitute for less domestic abatement by funding additional abatement abroad at a 
higher unit cost to the taxpayer. If the price of CDM/JI credits exceeds the EU ETS price, 
the Kyoto credits market will become a largely public-sector funded operation, rather 
than leveraging the private investment that many had originally envisaged.  
 
 
As it is frequently assumed that the installations of the covered sector, especially the 
power sector, have easier accessible emission reduction options one could have expected 
that the ETS share of the national emission budget should have declined, rather than 
increased as some current plans seem to envisage. Preliminary estimates suggest that the 
cost of weak allocations to governments, in aggregate, could be several billion Euros, but 
distributed very unequally between the different countries.  
 
V.c. Implications for auctioning and other mechanisms 
 
As noted, if the EU ETS is to be an effective market during the Kyoto period, the process 
from hereon must reduce the currently proposed volume of total free allocations, 
probably by a couple of hundred MtCO2 per year. However, our analysis has emphasized 
the irreducible uncertainty associated with emission projections. This suggests that 
Member States should consider carefully measures to increase price stability and thus 
provide investment certainty.  
One option would be increased use of auctions. Auctions in themselves could in 
principle provide a source of revenue for government purchase of Kyoto credits. In 
addition, if all MS were to auction allowances within the 10% limit of the Directive (200 
Mt/yr) and the auctions where implemented with a price floor, then this would cover the 
range of uncertainty in the projections (Hepburn e.a. 2006). This could ensure that in the 
case of low emissions a reduced inflow from the auctions would maintain prices, without 
distorting the demand/supply balance in the case of higher demand. 
Banking of allowances to the period post-2012 could also help to support the price, if 
participants believe that the future allowance price will be higher. Banking has worked 
effectively in SO2 and NOX programs in the US (Ellerman 2004). However, the same 
mechanism in the EU ETS would subject to high degree of uncertainty due to its iterative 
allocation approach and the complexity of post-2012 negotiations. These added 
uncertainties could subject the EU ETS to greater price volatility, and may thus reduce 
the effectiveness of banking as a mechanism to reduce investment risk.3 
                                                 
3 Note also that in the longer term governments could issue option contracts for CO2, also ensuring a 
price floor (Ismer and Neuhoff 2006). European governments could thus guarantee buying back allowances 
until the scarcity of allowances is increased to the strike price of the option contracts.  
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VI. Caveats and Sensitivities 
 
It is important to note that this study does not calculate the impact of CO2 prices on the 
CO2 emissions of the non-power sector. It relies on (a) a DTI study, which assumes CO2 
emissions under 0 CO2 price and then gives aggregate figures on the price response of the 
covered sector to allowance prices, and (b) the E3ME study, which assumes a positive 
allowance price (increasing from 18 to 25 €/tCO2 during phase II). Using data from the 
E3ME study, our emission projections for the non-power ETS sectors decrease by 85 Mt 
relative to our simulations based on DTI data. As both approaches differ in various 
dimensions, it is not clear to what extent this difference can be attributed to the emission 
reductions or due to CO2 prices. Therefore we did not differentiate between both 
approaches, and depicted the results both for the 0 and 20 €/tCO2 case as a component of 
the prediction uncertainty. 
 
Table 2 illustrates how different assumptions affect the projected CO2 emissions from the 
EU ETS sectors. As basis for the previous two Figures we had calculated the impact of 
combining all these scenarios. 
 
(Average 2008-12) 0 CO2 price 20 €/tCO2 
 MtCO2/year Change MtCO2/year change 
Base case favouring gas, DTI  2333  2199  
Matisse study with E3ME for non power 2248 -3,7% 2114 -3,9% 
Fuel price scenario central favouring coal 2397 2,7% 2270 3,2% 
Fuel price scenario low fuel price 2297 -1,6% 2141 -2,6% 
Fuel price scenario high fuel price 2425 3,9% 2388 8,6% 
GDP growth 0.75% higher/a (= CO2 growth) 2404 3,1% 2266 3,0% 
GDP growth 0.75% lower/a (= CO2 growth) 2264 -3,0% 2134 -3,0% 
Table 2 Sensitivity of projected CO2 emissions to model parameters 
 
 
VI Conclusion 
 
We combined a detailed power sector model for all European countries with two 
approaches to project emissions of the non power sector emissions covered by ETS and 
simulated CO2 emissions until 2012. We used the data from currently available national 
allocation plans and extrapolated to the outstanding plans to determine the currently 
envisaged emission cap under ETS for the period 2008-2012. We also made assumptions 
about the possible inflows of JI and CDM project credits into the ETS.  
 
The result suggests that it is possible that emissions will fall short of the allowances in the 
scheme in a scenario where we assumed 0 CO2 prices and it is very likely that emissions 
will fall short of allowances in the scheme in a scenario with 20 Euro t/CO2. Thus very 
low CO2 prices are likely to result from the currently envisaged NAPs. In the current 
arrangement only extensive banking into the period post 2012 could ensure a significant 
positive CO2 price. However, given the uncertainty about post 2012 arrangements such 
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banking is unlikely to attribute very high values to allowances, and given the complexity 
of political negotiations, such banking is likely to introduce large volatilities in the prices 
of ETS allowances throughout the period 2008-2012. 
 
The range of CO2 emission we simulated for the year 2008-2012 illustrates how sensitive 
emissions can be to changing GDP growth rates, fuel prices and to energy intensity and 
technology development in all sectors. To increase the predictability of CO2 prices in the 
light of this uncertainty one might consider using the flexibility of the EU Directive and 
reducing free allocation to sectors that are not exposed to competition outside of the EU 
(e.g. power sector). The allowances not issued for free could then be auctioned, e.g. 10% 
of the allowances issued per country. If a harmonised European price floor were to be 
used in these auctions, then this could help to manage the volatility inherent in any 
system in which cutbacks are modest compared to the intrinsic uncertainties in emission 
trends, and create confidence that the price will not drop below the price floor. This 
would facilitate investment in low Carbon technologies and energy efficiency. 
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Appendix I Verified Emissions 
 
We started with verified emission data (EU Commission 2006a) differentiated into iron 
and steel, cement, lime, glass, pulp and paper, ceramics, others and primary aluminium. 
Based on WIFO (2006) we separated the classification combustion installations into 
power and non-power related combustion installations. Since we could not allocate the 
non-power combustion installations to specific sectors we included them in the category 
‘others’. 
 
For Poland only data on 284 installations was available as of 21st of September 2006, 
representing allocated allowances for 110.7 MtCO2 out of a total NAP I of 239.1 MtCO2. 
We assumed that the installations not reported in the CITL will have the same ratio to 
allocated emissions as the installations for which already reported data is available. Thus 
we assumed 189.4 MtCO2 emissions for Polish installations covered by ETS in 2005 
(implying a total national surplus of 49.6 MtCO2). In our simulations of the European 
power sector, we calculated 132 MtCO2 emissions for Polish power installations covered 
by ETS, and used this figure to separate between power and non-power related emissions. 
 
For Cyprus and Malta no data was available and we assumed that they have the same 
ratio between verified emissions and NAP I allocation as the Member States for which 
full data was available. We did not have data available that allowed us for a 
differentiation between power and non-power installations and thus applied general 
emission growth trend to all emissions. 
 
We added to these verified emissions the volume of new installations covered under NAP 
II that either opted out or were not covered under NAP I (17 Mt in Germany, 32 Mt in the 
UK, 6.6 MtCO2 in Netherlands, 5.5 in France).  
 
Appendix II Projections for non-power sector 
 
To project the CO2 emissions for the non-power sector, we first used an approach based 
on a recent DTI study (2006 a,b) and then an approach based on a European model of 
Cambridge Econometrics. 
 
For the first approach we applied to the verified emissions per sector and country the 
sector specific emission growth rates used by the UK DTI (2006 a,b), scaled by the 
differences in the expected national growth rates (Table 3). For example the Spanish 
GDP is expected to grow 0.6 % faster in 2006 than the UK GDP, thus we also assumed 
that emissions across the sectors increase by 0.6% faster in Spain than in the UK. GDP 
growth projections for the period 2006-2007 are based on Eurostat (2006) and for the 
period 2008-2012 based on OECD (2006) and IMF (2006). 
 
 
 2006 2007 2008-2012 
AT 2,5% 2,2% 2,4% 
BE 2,3% 2,1% 1,9% 
CY 3,8% 3,8% 2,8% 
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CZ 5,3% 4,7% 3,8% 
DE 1,7% 1,0% 2,0% 
DK 3,2% 2,3% 1,1% 
EE 8,9% 7,9% 4,6% 
ES 3,1% 2,8% 2,5% 
FI 3,6% 2,9% 1,5% 
FR 1,9% 2,0% 2,1% 
GR 3,5% 3,4% 3,1% 
HU 4,6% 4,2% 3,0% 
IE 4,9% 5,1% 3,6% 
IT 1,3% 1,2% 1,4% 
LT 6,5% 6,2% 4,6% 
LU 4,4% 4,5% 4,0% 
LV 8,5% 7,6% 4,6% 
MT 1,7% 1,9% 4,6% 
NL 2,6% 2,6% 2,1% 
PL 4,5% 4,6% 4,5% 
PT 0,9% 1,1% 2,0% 
SE 3,4% 3,0% 1,8% 
SI 4,3% 4,1% 4,6% 
SK 6,1% 6,5% 5,5% 
UK 2,4% 2,8% 2,5% 
Sources:    
2006-2007 data from Eurostat (2006) 
2008-2012 data from OECD (2006), except for CY, EE, LT, 
LV, MT and SI from IMF (2006). 
Table 3 Assumed GDP growth rates. 
 
The second approach uses sector and country specific growth rate computed from 
Cambridge Econometrics modelling. They represent those of the baseline scenario for the 
FP6 project Matisse using the E3ME model, covering the 2005-2010 period (Matisse 
2006). For the purpose of this paper we assume that the sector specific growth rates are 
constant in 2011 and 2012. As the definitions of sectors under E3ME did not exactly 
match the classifications of verified emissions, we matched these sectors as described in 
Table 4. 
 
 
CITL Matisse/E3ME 
Refineries 2 - Other energy own use and transformation 
Cement and Lime 6 - Non metallic nes 
Ceramics 6 - Non metallic nes 
Glass 6 - Non metallic nes 
Pulp and Paper 10 - Pulp and Paper 
Iron and Steel 3 - Iron and Steel 
Other 12 - Other industry 
Table 4 Mapping of E3ME model results to classification used for verified emissions 
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Appendix III Projections for power sector 
 
For our analysis of the European power sector, we use the Integrated Planning Model 
(IPM®) developed by ICF International. The Integrated Planning Model (IPM®) is a 
linear programming model that selects generating and investment options to meet overall 
electricity demand today and on an ongoing and forward looking basis over the chosen 
planning horizon at minimum cost. Further details about the model are available from the 
EPA website (http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/epa-ipm/). 
 
Table 5 gives the fuel price assumptions for which we followed the July study of the 
Department of Trade and Industry in the UK (DTI 2006c). These prices were also applied 
to other European countries, correcting for location/transport costs and adjusting the 
differing intra annual price profile for gas between the UK and continental Europe. 
Demand projections are based on the UCTE forecasts for all Member States except the 
UK (based on DTI projections). 
 
 
Oil ($/bbl) Gas (p/therm) Coal (£/t) Oil ($/bbl) Gas (p/therm) Coal (£/t)
2005 55 41 33,6 55 41 33,6
2010 40 25,8 27,2 40 33,5 27,2
2015 42,5 27,3 26,1 42,5 35 26,1
2020 45 28,8 25 45 36,5 25
Oil ($/bbl) Gas (p/therm) Coal (£/t) Oil ($/bbl) Gas (p/therm) Coal (£/t)
2005 55 41 33,6 55 41 33,6
2010 67 49,9 36,5 20 18 19
2015 69,5 51,4 36,5 20 19,5 16,8
2020 72 53 36,5 20 21 14,6
Central - Favouring GAS Central - Favouring COAL
High prices Low prices
 
Table 5 Fossil fuel price assumptions from DTI (2006c) 
 
We assumed that the EU renewables target is satisfied. The model calculates the 
emissions for all power stations. For one base case we determined the volume of 
emissions that results from installations with less than 20 MW thermal capacity (56.4 
MtCO2/year). As these installations are mainly heat driven we assumed the emissions to 
stay constant across the time frame considered and across fuel price scenarios. 
 
For the simulations, we constrained newbuild CCGT and coal plants to those already 
commissioned until 2013. The only plants coming on before 2013 are firm builds, 
unplanned CT units and unplanned wind installations (this reflects the idea that CCGT or 
coal plant to become operational by 2012 already have to be commissioned today). This 
might understate the potential for emissions reductions from a more rapid shift to gas 
through additional investment in gas generation. However, given that we already observe 
an increase of gas demand for power generation in Europe in the low fuel price scenario 
with ETS price (from 6700 TBtu to 11300 TBtu coverage exceeding ETS), it is 
reasonable to assume caution with additional shifts to gas generation. 
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Table 6 presents the aggregate CO2 emissions for the European power sector (including 
the small installations with less than 20 MW thermal capacity). 
 
 
CO2 price 
Fossil fuel price 
scenario  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
0 €/tCO2 
Central - Fav GAS 2251 2281 2333 2303 2282 2344 2403 
Central - Fav COAL 2250 2285 2343 2354 2373 2429 2485 
High Prices 2250 2283 2337 2370 2414 2474 2529 
Low Prices 2251 2284 2334 2268 2221 2295 2368 
20 €/tCO2 
Central - Fav GAS 2210 2251 2237 2158 2130 2201 2269 
Central - Fav COAL 2222 2265 2281 2232 2217 2278 2342 
High Prices 2234 2273 2307 2324 2375 2439 2496 
Low Prices 2208 2245 2197 2122 2045 2128 2212 
20 €/tCO2 
Central – Fav gas, 
minimum gas constraint 2110       
Table 6 EU emission projections for power sector using IPM® model (MtCO2) 
 
When comparing the model results in 2006 with the 2005 verified power sector emissions 
we observed that we exceeded these emissions. This is what we expected as many gas 
power stations have long-term take-or-pay contracts and were thus operating despite the 
high 2005 gas prices. To test our model, we implemented a minimum run requirement on 
gas. On a country by country level the same amount of gas had to be used in the power 
sector in the 2006 as observed in 2003. Using this constraint our 2006 simulated data for 
all countries excluding Poland, Malta and Cyprus exceeded the verified emission data for 
the power sector of these countries by only 2%. Most deviations on a per country level 
could be explained by the specific climatic conditions in the year 2005. Thus we were 
content to use the model for emission projections. 
 
For our long-term projections we did not apply the minimum gas consumption constraint. 
We assume that the take-or-pay contracts for gas that we reflected in this constraint will 
be resolved as part of the European liberalisation or that new gas powered stations are 
exposed to the market price for gas. 
 
 
Appendix IV   NAPs II 
 
We used information on the second phase cap from the National Allocation Plans 
submitted to the European Commission (2006b), and from the NAP II drafts published 
for public debate by those countries that had not officially approved them yet, as they 
represent the most up to date data available. 
 
As the NAPs for DK and HU have not been published (as of 24.9.2006) we assumed the 
same ratio between their cap 2005-2007 and 2008-2012 as applicable to average of the 
other member states. 
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We included the entire New Entrant Reserve in the cap and also included the emissions 
that are currently envisaged for auctions (7 %UK, 1.22% Austria, 0.29% Belgium, 2.6 
MtCO2 Poland, 2.32 MtCO2 Lithuania, 0.5 MtCO2 Ireland, 0.19 MtCO2 Luxembourg). 
 
We assume total available CDM and JI credits for the period 2008-2012 are between 800 
and 2200 MtCO2 while Japanese demand could range between 250 and 1000 MtCO2 
(Grubb and Neuhoff, 2006). Very high availability is unlikely to coincide with very low 
Japanese demand and vice versa. We also have to allow for demand from governments to 
cover excess emissions in the non-covered sector. Thus we assume that inflows into ETS 
in the period 2008-2012 could range between 0 and 1000 MtCO2. Table 1 summarises 
our assumptions about the cap. 
 
 
Appendix VI Historical emissions and linear trend 
 
We used data on the total per country green house gas emissions for the period 1990-
2004 from the annual European Community GHG Inventory (EEA 2006). 
 
Projections for 2005-2012 have been obtained by linear regression of the available 
sample of total GHG emissions for each country. The initial analysis on a country by 
country level pointed to the well known strong decline of emissions in accession 
countries during their early transformation in the 1990th, and therefore we subsequently 
excluded data for Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia and Slovakia for 
the years until 1992, 1993, 1992, 1998, 1995 and 1993 for the estimation of the linear 
trend. 
 
We then used data on the ETS share of CO2 emissions relative to the total GHG 
emissions from Georgopoulou et al. (2005) based on 2003 data and thus were able to 
derive the a linear trend for EU ETS BaU emissions projections. 
 
By adopting this procedure the implicit assumption has been made that the proportion of 
greenhouse gases from “trading” and “non-trading” sectors would remain unchanged. As 
emissions from some of the non-trading sectors such as transports are expected in fact to 
increase significantly, it is likely that our approach overstates the CO2 emissions of the 
covered sector. 
 
 
Appendix VII CITL classifications 
 
An analysis of the CITL raw data performed by Entec highlighted the existence of ‘some 
fundamental errors with regards to classification in the EC database of sites by 
sector/activity’, although the cause is ‘not yet known’ (Entec 2006: p4). Some of the 
problems of miss-classification are addressed in our projections: 
a) An analysis of the CITL classification compared to that of NAP I for Spain, Italy 
and UK illustrates some differences, which are however not persistent across 
countries and sectors. For Italy the discrepancy is minimal (with the maximum 
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around 2%), while although it is more relevant for UK and Spain, it is not in the 
same sectors. Therefore on aggregate they might to some extent average out. 
b) Thanks to more accurate aggregate country data for the power sector (including 
CHP) provided by WIFO it has been possible to correctly distinguish non-power 
verified emissions from the CITL “Combustion” class, thus substantially reducing 
the possible distortion scope to only 44% of the total cap in terms of allocations. 
c) If remaining errors are in the order of 5% and imply misspecification between 
sectors that have different projected CO2 growth rates of 2% then the aggregate 
error (1.027 after 7 years, e.g. 15%) is 0.3%. 
 
 
Appendix VIII Analysis: Allocated versus verified 
 
Based on the data available in the Community Independent Transaction Log we could 
compare for every installation the verified emissions with the allocated allowances for the 
year 2005 (EU Commission 2006a). We grouped all installations where over/under 
allocation fall within ranges of ± 2.5% under/over allocation. The intervals are then 
labelled according to the middle value of the interval. The remaining installations were 
summarised in the +100% and -100% categories. 
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Figure 5 Relationship between verified emissions and allowances allocated to installations in 2005. 
 
 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of total emission permits according to the extent of 
under/over allocation at installation level as a fraction of the allocation received. The 
distribution is bell shaped with a mean higher than zero, reflecting the overall long 
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position of the EU ETS. According to the CITL classification, Non Combustion 
installations in general received more allowances compared to the needs than 
Combustion, although the latter includes both Power and non-power sector installations, 
thus distorting the analysis adding over allocated installations to the category. 
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